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Abstract 
The great recession heralded in by the subprime mortgage crisis, took a dramatic turn for worse as a result 
of collapse of the Lehman Brothers bank in September 2008. The crisis deemed to be the most devastating 
after the Great Depression of 1929, had a debilitating effect on world economies, developing and advanced 
alike.  The extent of its devastation which is still being felt in Europe and many parts of the globe reminds 
us the interconnectedness of financial institutions, particularly those tagged TBTF or SIFIs. Policy makers 
scrambled to curtail the ugly effect of the crisis by rescuing the SIFIs within their jurisdiction largely 
through bailout mechanism and provision of implicit guarantee for the debts of failing/failed institutions. 
As soon as the tide is stemmed, they cast their gaze on new crisis resolution and recovery measures that 
could rein in systemic risks associated with SIFIs, prevent future crises and reduce the concomitant moral 
hazards in the current resolution measures. The objective of this paper is to assess ex ante the potential 
impacts of implementing the new Banking recovery and resolution directives on Europe’s TBTF banks. 
Key Words: bailouts, implicit guarantee, systemic risk, bail-in, asset-separation, too-big-to-fail, bridge 
bank, financial crisis, bank recovery, resolution 
JEL classification: G18, G28
Introduction 
“We have a very strange situation in which it’s the worst of capitalism and socialism, a situation in which profits were 
privatised and losses were socialised.”  Nassim Taleb (2009) 
Among other factors, one of the major causes of the great depression in 1930 was massive bank failures, many banks 
failed during this period. In less than ten decades after the great catastrophe, the world had witnessed many more 
financial or banking related crises of different magnitude and devastating impact. During and after each major 
financial crisis, government, central bankers, regulators and policy makers would come up with policy responses to 
combat its effects on both the real economy and the financial system. Many of these recovery and resolution actions 
were inadequate and fire fighting in nature. Studies have shown that these responses were not well conceived, 
inconsistent, in-effective and poorly implemented (Thornton L. Daniel 2012; Bech, M. et al 2012; Mishkin S. Frederic 
2009). The sheer number of financial crises that had occurred since the great depression gives credence to the fact that 
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the shoddy responses were neither ineffective in resolving existing crisis nor potent enough to prevent another one 
from occurring. The outbreak and the handling of the 2007 -2008 global financial crises further confirmed the 
inadequacies and inconsistencies in financial crisis resolution and prevention policies. 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers a systemic important financial institution (SIFI)1  almost brought the World 
economy to its knees. The domino effect of the collapse of Lehman still casts an ugly shadow on the global financial 
systems (Hal S. Scott 2011; Dumontaux, N. and Pop A. 2009). The effect from the collapse is both devastating and far 
reaching, it left no stone unturned, no economy, developed or emerging is spared.  Five years on, the largest economy 
in the world is still gasping for breath and Europe is not out of the woods yet. Worst hit countries in Europe: Spain, 
Ireland, Greece, Italy, Cyprus and Portugal to mention but a few, are still wriggling under the crushing weight of the 
great recession. 
Like many financial crises preceding it, the resolution of the current global financial crisis came with its attendant 
flaws and issues. Resolution was largely done through a variety of bailout policies, where governments use tax 
payer’s money to provide direct loans2 to ailing banks or implicit guarantee for bank debt (Schich, S. and Lindh, S. 
2012). While bailouts assure the “going concern” of the rescued institutions, it also encourages moral- hazard3 
behaviour by the failed bank to engage in excessive risk taking (Kevin, D. 2009; Samwick, M. 2009).  In order to 
address the systemic risks and moral-hazard associated with the disorderly failure of systemic important financial 
institutions (SIFIs), the European Union adopted and align its Bank Recovery and Resolution Directives (BRRD) to 
the Financial Stability Board (FSB) Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions which is  
the new international standard for resolution regimes (FSB 2013).   
The intent of this paper is to provide ex ante assessment of possible implications of the new banking recovery and 
resolution directives on the systemic important financial institutions (SIFIs) in the European Union.  The remainder of 
the paper is organised as follows. Section 3 reviews the available literature addressing the impacts of the recent global 
financial crisis on systemic important financial institutions. Section 4 summarises the policy responses to the recent 
financial crisis in different countries and in the European Union and highlights the key requirements of the new 
European bank recovery and resolution directives. In Section 5, we assess the potential impacts of the implementation 
of the resolution tools of the new directives on systemic important financial institutions in the EU. Section 6 
concludes with a summary discussion of potential impact of the implementation of the EU RRD on SIFIs in the 
European Union 
Impact of Financial Crises on SIFIs  
The recent financial crisis has a huge impact on systemic Important Financial Institutions; it’s distressing effect can be 
felt in almost every business area and process of a bank. A fairly large literature investigates the impact of financial 
crisis on large, complex and interconnected banks. The great recession did affect banks in different ways, depending 
on the funding capability of each bank. Kapan and Minoiu (2013) find that banks that were ex ante more dependent on 
market funding and had lower structural liquidity reduced supply of credit more than other banks during crisis. The 
ability of banks to generate interest income during the financial crisis was hampered because there was a vast 
reduction in bank lending to individuals and businesses. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2008) document that new loans to 
large borrowers fell by 37% during the peak of the 2007 -2008 financial crisis, and also, banks with more revolving 
lines outstanding relatives to deposits reduced their lending more than those with less revolving line exposure.  
The ensuing credit squeeze that marked the great recession was accentuated by in ability of banks to grant credits to 
the private sector of the economy, an empirical study conducted by Barajas etal (2010) concluded that private sector 
                                                             
1 FSB( 2010) defines  SIFIs as institutions of such size, market importance, and global interconnectedness that their distress or 
failure would cause significant dislocation in the global financial system and adverse economic consequences across a range of 
countries. The criteria for designating a bank as a SIFI or a TBTF include Size, Complexity of its operations and its 
interconnectedness. 
2 In 2008/2009 the following SIFIs received the U.S government Bailout loan: Bear Stearns $30billion, Citigroup $280billion, 
Bank of America $142.2billion. 
In the U.K: Royal Bank of Scotland £37billion, Lloyds TSB and HBOS £17billion. In addition the U.K treasury planned a 
£200billion guarantee to banks. – The Telegraph, 19 Jan 2009 
3 Ennis and Malik (2005) develop a theoretical model of the effect of TBTF policy on bank decision-making. The result is consistent 
with moral hazard; a known TBTF policy increases the probability of failure of the bank. 
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credit from commercial banks slowed from annual rates of 8 per cent or greater from 2003 through the first quarter of 
2008, to just over 2 per cent by the last quarter of 2008, and afterward recorded negative growth for the first time in 
the decade. During the financial crisis, banks had difficulties managing their liquidity as short term funding market 
came to a halt. The efforts to manage liquidity crisis by many banks contributed to short supply of credit to the private 
sector (Cornett et al 2011). As a result of tight liquidity and decline in credit supply during the financial crisis, banks 
became selective in their lending; many large European and American banks withdrew credits from emerging 
economies. Hass and Horen (2011) find that during the crisis banks continued to lend more to countries that have 
geographic affinity, where they have built close relationship with other lenders and borrowers. 
Recent studies have investigated the impact of the 2007-2009 financial crises on banks’ capital. Berger and Bouwman 
(2011) emphasised the importance of capital during financial crisis. Their empirical study concludes that banks with 
solid capital base have some benefits during the crisis than those that are poorly capitalised. Well capitalised banks are 
more able to withstand the shocks due to liquidity squeeze, and therefore had higher chances of surviving the crisis 
period. Other benefits accrued to well capitalised banks include increase in their market share and profitability, as 
customers withdrew their funds from less capitalised to a well-capitalised banks. This conclusion was also reinforced 
by a recent empirical study conducted Olivier de Bandt et al (2014) on a sample of large French banks over a period 
of 1993 – 2012.  Similarly, Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011) demonstrate the existence of structural changes 
during the period of financial crisis; they conclude that banks with weaker core capital, with greater reliance on short 
term market- funding and on non-interest sources of income restricted the loan supply more strongly during the crisis. 
Using a multi-country panel of banks, Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache and Merrouche (2010) find among others results, 
that during financial crisis, higher capital resulted in better stock performance. The argument that higher capital leads 
to a better performance has been rejected by many bank managers, they argue that regulators usually required banks to 
hold more capital during crisis and that capital held for regulatory capital requirements are not generally available for 
banks normal businesses such as lending during crisis. This argument has been strengthened by some academic 
literatures (Baker and Wurgler 2013; Kashyap, Stein, and Hanson 2010; Manela and Kisin  2014). 
In their paper titled “the Impact of the Recent Financial Crisis on the Capital Positions of Large U.S. Financial 
Institutions” Strah, Hynes and Shaffer (2013)  make use of data obtained during the Great Financial Crisis to analyse 
and measure the potential risk to capital positions at a number of  U.S.  systemic important financial institutions 
during a period of severe stress. Analysing data from 26 banks, they  perform a historically  based  analysis  of  the 
extent to which  losses from  financial institutions’  risk  exposures  would have  eroded their capital  ratios  under 
certain  assumed  constraints. Their analysis shows that the capital depletion by the Great Financial Crisis at large 
U.S. financial institutions was extensive and often rapid. 
The impact of financial crisis on SIFIs is not limited to funding, capital, liquidity and growth; a number of studies 
have shown that the crisis also has a significant effect on bank operational losses (see, Cope and Carrivick 2013; 
Akinsoyinu, 2015). Others include Belas (2013) who finds that the low level of satisfaction and loyalty of bank 
employees during financial crisis is transferred to the low acceptance rate of customer need to sell bank’s products 
particularly in Slovakia, which has led to a decline in the overall customer satisfaction. 
The European Union’s Policy Responses to the 2007-2009 Financial 
Crisis  
Policy Response - Global Perspective 
The sheer scale of the effect of the great recession on world economies was a rude awakening to both governments 
and policy makers. The fear that the crisis could spin out of control if not decisively managed was palpable in every 
part of the globe. As Obama, then a president-elect so succinctly put it to the American congress “the most important 
message today is that situation is getting worse, we’ve got to act boldly, and we’ve got to act swiftly. We cannot 
delay”…”it is clear that we have to act and we have to act now to address this crisis and break the momentum of the 
recession, or the next few years could be dramatic worse”.  
The actions taken by various governments and policy makers triggered unprecedented fiscal and monetary policy 
intervention, chiefly in the United States and Western Europe.  Many countries, particularly in North America and 
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Europe have provided significant amount of tax payers’4 money to support their failing financial institutions, 
particularly the so called Too-Big-to-Fail banks. In their study, Anderson, Cavanagh and Redman (2008) finds that as 
at November 2008, the United States had committed a whopping  $1.3 trillion, while the European Financial sector 
bailouts  had climbed to $2.8 trillion (see Table 1 and Table 2 respectively).  This brought the total U.S and Some E.U 
spending on financial bailouts to $4.1 trillion. 
Table 1: US Commitment to Financial Sector Bailout as of November 19, 2008) ($ Billions Unless Otherwise Stated) 
Program Amount Description 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) 700 
Original plan was to use the funds primarily to purchase 
troubled mortgage-related assets. The Treasury Secretary 
has since decided to use the funds for cash injections for 
banks. 
Commercial paper funding facility 243 
Through this facility, the Fed buys commercial paper (short-
term debts) from banks to help finance day-to-day business 
operations. 
Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac 200 
Federal officials assumed control of the mortgage firms and 
are providing cash injections to keep them afloat 
AIG 112.5 
Does not include $40 billion drawn from the $700 billion 
bailout fund. After an initial bailout in October, AIG 
negotiated a larger rescue package with easier terms. 
Bear Stearns 29 
Special lending facility to guarantee losses on the 
investment bank’s portfolio; facilitated buyout by 
JPMorgan. 
FDIC bank takeovers 13.2 
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation has put up to  
cover deposits on failed banks. 
Total U.S. $1.3 trillion   
Source: Anderson, Cavanagh and Redman (Instituted for Policy Studies, November2008) 
Table 2: Western European Commitment to Financial Sector Bailout as of November 19, 2008 
($ Billions Unless Otherwise Stated) 
Country Amount Description 
United Kingdom 743 
The UK bailout was the first announced and largely served as the model 
for other European rescues. Half of the package is for guaranteeing inter-
bank lending, 40% for short-term loans and 10% for recapitalization 
Germany 636.5 
The bulk is to guarantee medium-term bank lending, with 20% for 
recapitalization. 
France 458.3 
The bulk is to guarantee bank debt, with about $50 billion for 
recapitalization. 
Netherlands 346 To guarantee inter-bank loans 
Sweden 200 For credit guarantees 
Austria 127.3 For bank buyouts, interbank lending, and bank bond issuance guarantees 
Spain 127.3 For bank buyouts, interbank lending, and bank bond issuance guarantees 
Italy 51 To purchase bank debts 
Other European countries 110.6 
 
Total European 
$2.8 
trillion  
                                                             
4 Support measures provided by governments are not limited to cash, it comes in various forms. 
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Source: Anderson, Cavanagh and Redman (Instituted for Policy Studies, November2008) 
Besides the measures directed towards the financial sectors, many countries have implemented wide-ranging fiscal 
(see Table2 and Figure 1) and stimulus (see Figure 2) programmes to jump start their respective economies 
Table 3: The absolute size of fiscal packages (revenue and spending measures) 2008-2010, 
(in absolute USD millions) 
United States 804,070 
Germany 107,789 
Japan 99,992 
Canada 61,551 
Spain 56,754 
Australia 42,673 
Korea 42,667 
United Kingdom 38,003 
France 18,568 
Netherlands 13,367 
Sweden 13,109 
Denmark 8,668 
Finland 8,575 
Belgium 8,016 
Czech Republic 6,500 
New Zealand 5,404 
Poland 5,145 
Austria 4,600 
Switzerland 2,486 
Luxembourg 1,968 
Portugal 1,963 
Slovak Republic 35 
Source: OECD 
Our focus in this section however, is to provide a brief analysis of the various policy measures employed to combat 
the financial crisis by selected countries in the European Union. We will make references to the United States and 
other countries for comparison purposes only. 
European Union Policy Responses 
By mid-September in 2008, the financial crisis has developed into a full-blown, global economic crisis. The EU is in 
recession, the IMF predicts an economic contraction of 0.3% for the advanced countries and the global economy is in 
downward spiral. The depth of the crisis is underscored by the extreme measures taken by the governments of 
Member States. These measures were among the most aggressive economic crises management tools in history. Huge 
amount of tax payers’ money5 was injected into the financial sector to wrestle the systemic important financial 
institutions from total collapse and the economy from descending into abyss. Koopman, G. (2011) documented that 
before the outbreak of the financial crisis, total State Aid in the European Union was about 0.5 percent of Gross 
Domestic (“GDP”). By October 1, 2011, the Commission had approved €4506.5 billion (36.7 percent of EU GDP) in 
aid. The aid provided was mainly in the form of injection of capital to ailing banks, bank deposit guarantees, relief of 
impared assets and liquidity and support for bank funding. Table 5 shows the amount committed to the banking sector 
in the EU zone as a percentage of GDP. 
 
 
                                                             
5 See Table 2. Before the financial crisis,  
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Table 4: EU: Public Interventions6 in the EU Banking Sector: 2008–2011 
(In billions of Euros, unless indicated otherwise) 
Measures 
Used Amounts Approved Amounts 
% of GDP % of GDP 
Capital injections     288 2.4 598 4.9 
Guarantees on bank liabilities   1,112 9.1 3,290 26.8 
Relief of impaired assets   121 1 421 3.4 
Liquidity and bank funding support 87 0.7 198 1.6 
Total       1,608 13.1 4,506 36.7 
Source: EU Commission 
The EU Recovery and Resolution Directive (RRD) 
The bank recovery and resolution directive is a three-staged framework: the preparation and prevention stage, the 
early intervention stage and the resolution stage . The resolution stage comprises the four main resolution tools 
proposed by the Commission. To resolve a bank in crisis, policy makers can either administered each of the resolution 
tools individually or in combination. The choice and mode of resolution tool to be applied when a financial institution 
is in crisis will be determined by responsible authority on a case-by-case basis. 
Why is the new banking resolution directive needed?  
The financial crisis has put to test the effectiveness of the policy measures at the disposal of the policy makers – both 
at the global and the EU level. A report initiated by the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) documented that, 
20 bank debt guarantee, 15 bank recapitalization schemes and 44 cases of individual bank aid cases were dealt with by 
the European Commission under the state aid rules during the crisis. There were evidences to support the claim that 
the policy measures initiated by EU policy makers during the crisis have positive effects and largely contributed to the 
successful management of the crisis. Baldacci et al, (2009), finds that timely countercyclical fiscal measures 
contribute to shortening the length of crisis episodes by stimulating aggregate demand. Coenen, Straub and Trabandt 
(2012) and Carvalho et al (2012) find a positive link between the policies and measures of inflation and real GDP 
growth expectations. 
If the measures employed to manage the crisis are largely successful as claimed by some policy makers around the 
world and evidenced by some studies, then the question remain, why is the need for a new directive to deal with 
failing credit institutions? According to Bernanke7, “Government policy responses around the world will be critical 
determinants of the speed and vigour of the recovery” Not everyone agrees. Taylor (2008) provided empirical 
evidence that government actions and interventions have contributed to the causes, protraction and deterioration of the 
crisis. Aiccia, G. and Ratnovski, L (2012), Kim (2013), Hett, F and Schmidt, A (2012) concluded that the bailout 
programme which forms the core of the policy measures initiated to avert a financial system collapse has not only 
increased moral hazard but also encouraged aggressive risk-taking by failed/failing financial institutions. The results 
of a model study conducted by Dam, L. and Koetter, M (2011) reveal that an increase in the expected bailout 
probability by 1% increases the probability of being in distress by 7.2 basis points, and that the marginal effect of 
moral hazard on risk taking is large compared to other bank-specific risk determinants. Studies have also shown that 
bailing out banks which are deemed too big to fail with rationed public finances is becoming increasingly 
unsustainable Hucek, J. et al (2009). 
To reduce the moral hazard embedded in the current bailout policy measures, among others, the FSB came up with the 
Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions. The “Key Attributes” will form the basis for 
a new standard for resolution regimes.  The EU framework for the recovery and resolution directive is aligned with 
the “Key Attributes” and is designed with the aim of reducing the risk of further bank failures, and minimising the 
impact of a bank’s failure on the financial system in future. There is also a need to harmonise the different regimes in 
                                                             
6 Those figures do not include the Long Term Refinancing Operations (LTRO) amounts––including LTRO, the amount of money 
committed to banks stand at 23 percent of EU GDP. 
7 Ben S. Bernanke was the formal chairman of the United State Federal Reserve. He delivered a lecture titled “The crisis and the 
policy response” at the Stamp lecture, London School of Economics, January 13, 2009. 
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the EU (see Table 5). Lack of coordination means that each Member State pursues different resolution agenda. Table 
5 highlights key elements in some selected resolution frameworks in the EU versus those of the new EU directive8. 
 
Table 5: Main Elements of Selected Resolution Framework in the EU and the New EU Directive 
 Germany Denmark Netherlands United 
Kingdom 
New EU Directive 
 
 
 
 
Scope 
 
 
 
 
Credit 
Institutions 
 
 
 
 
Credit 
Institutions 
 
 
 
 
Credit Institutions 
Insurers 
 
 
 
 
Credit 
Institutions 
Others 
(1) Credit institutions 
and larger 
investment firms 
which are subject 
to Capital 
Requirement 
Directives. 
(2) EU intermediate 
financial holding 
companies 
(3) Subsidiary 
financial 
institutions head-
quartered in the 
EU. 
 
 
 
 
Resolution 
Tools 
Restructuring 
plan (potentially 
including 
haircuts on 
creditors). 
Transfer of 
assets/liabilities 
to another 
institution 
including a 
bridge bank. 
Transfer of 
assets/liabilities 
to another 
institution 
including a 
bridge bank. 
Transfer of 
shares, 
assets/liabilities 
to another 
institution 
including a bridge 
bank. Temporary 
public sector 
ownership 
Transfer of 
assets/liabilities 
to another 
institution 
including a 
bridge bank. 
Temporary 
public sector 
ownership 
(1) Sale of business, 
(2) A bridge bank, 
(3) Asset 
separation(involve
s transfer of “bad 
assets” to a 
separate vehicle 
(4) A bail-in tool 
Financing Resolution fund   
(ex ante funded) 
State-owned 
financial 
stability 
company with a 
guarantee from 
the DGS 
DGS can finance 
deposit it transfer 
DGS (currently       
ex post) 
(1) DGS (ex ante) for 
banks. Where ex 
ante contribution 
is not sufficient, ex 
post extra ordinary 
contributions and 
borrowing powers 
of Members States 
resolution funds to 
borrow from one 
another. 
Source: ECB 
What are the resolution tools and powers of the new Directives? 
In the light of the flaws and inadequacies in the existing resolution tools available for tackling bank failures, the EU 
Commission proposes that resolution authorities be given a number of resolution tools. According to the Commission, 
the choice of tools to be deployed will depend on the specific circumstances of each case and build on options laid out 
in the resolution plan prepared by the affected bank. They should include powers to: 
                                                             
8 Note that the new EU framework covers deposit-taking banks and some investment firms (e.g. institutions  
like Lehman Brothers). Investment firms such as Lehman Brothers were not covered in the existing framework and therefore could 
not receive bail out money to stay up. 
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Sale of business tool:  the power to initiate private sector acquisitions of failed/failing bank. This involves the sale of 
the bank or the whole or part of its business on commercial terms without shareholders’ consent or other procedural 
requirements. 
Asset separation tool: the power to separate “good” and “bad” bank. This tool will enable resolution authority to 
transfer high-risk assets and liabilities on the bank balance sheet to a public owned asset management vehicle. To 
overcome the moral hazard inherent in this tool, the Commission suggest that this tool is to be employed in 
conjunction with another resolution measures.      
Bridge bank tool: the power to transfer the rescued bank’s business to a temporary structure (for example a “bridge 
bank”). This will enable continued essential banking functions of the affected institution before its eventual sale to the 
private sector  
Bail-in tool: this is also known as the debt write-down or conversion tool, it involves the write-down of the claims of 
unsecured creditors of a failing financial institutions or the conversion of its debt claims into equity in order to restore 
the failing bank’s capital position. Table 6 summarised the eligible and exempted securities from the proposed bail-in 
tool, 
Table 6:  Eligible and Exempted Securities: The Possible Bail-in Perimeter under EC Proposals 
Eligible liabilities for bail-in   Exempted liabilities   
Senior subordinated unsecured debt with a maturity            
greater than one month 
Short-term liabilities (less than one month to maturity) 
OTC Derivatives liabilities, according to their maturity 
  Derivatives cleared through CCPs and derivatives 
excluded by national authorities could be exempted.   
Deposits exceeding the guarantee ceiling (€100,000 per 
depositor per bank), such as corporate or high net worth 
individual deposits.                                                                       
DGS schemes are included. 
Guaranteed deposits up to the limit. 
Secured liabilities not fully covered by collateral 
  Secured liabilities (e.g. covered bonds) up to the value of 
collateral   
            Client assets and money, and other operating liabilities 
(e.g. due to employees, tax authorities)             
Source: IMF 
These tools, according to the Commission would help to restructure ailing financial institution as a going concern, 
wind-down gone concern institutions in an orderly manner with minimal use of public fund and prevent negative 
impact on global and EU financial systems. 
Assessing the Impacts of EU Resolution Regimes on SIFIs 
The focus of this paper is to explore the potential impact of the proposed resolution tools of the new EU banking 
resolution and recovery directives on systemic important financial institutions in the EU. The directive is post the 
financial crisis and has not been implemented by any of the EU Member States.  Due to lack of data, it is difficult to 
empirically measure the impact of the new directive on systemic important banks. This paper provides an ex ante 
impact assessment of the new resolution regime on systemic important financial institution (SIFIs) in the European 
Union. 
Potential Impacts of bail-in tool 
The bail-in tool has been hailed by many policy makers as the perfect resolution tool for tackling failing/failed SIFIs. 
If properly implemented may reduce or eliminate government implicit bailout guarantee of SIFIs, reduce moral hazard 
inherent in bailout and safeguard financial system stability. According to the Commission, bail-in would be an 
invaluable tool to use to absorb losses of a going concern financial institution, and to wind down a gone concern 
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entity. According to Zhou. J, et al (2012), “the removal of the too-big-to-fail premium will help restore market 
discipline by aligning bank funding costs more closely with risks”. However, imposing losses on creditors of systemic 
important institutions could have massive implication for banks and the banking systems. These implications include 
the following: 
Impacts on bank’s funding Costs 
 Bail-in, by design requires mandatory capital write-down that is; the unsecured and subordinated debt claims of 
creditors of ailing SIFIs should first be written down or converted into equity before any public intervention. The 
implementation of bail-in could have a significant impact on banks’ funding costs. The financial and sovereign crises 
have already made it difficult to access unsecured funding in Europe, and with a bailing regime kicking in 2018, will 
become more difficult for banks within EU. Increasing funding costs induced by the bail-in regime could weigh on 
European banks currently under the pressure of meeting the requirement of Basel III’s net stable funding ratio 
(NSFR). According to a research conducted by Oliver Wyman, European banks will need to issue about 2.7 trillion 
Euros in long-term debt to meet net stable funding ratio requirement.  
 Investors in senior unsecured bank debt will demand a premium (“bail-in premium”) for the additional risk of having 
to meet losses if a financial institution is close to failure. Riskier SIFIs will be more affected as they will have to pay 
higher price to raise sufficient senior unsecured debt. Jassaud. N. and Lesle. V, (2012) documented that the additional 
cost/spread (resulting from bail-in) for a large, well-rated bank could vary between 300 basis points (bps) and 450 
bps, and over time, spreads of senior unsecured debt will converge toward those of subordinated debt and other capital 
instruments. Funding costs of systemic important banks have been rising since the financial crisis started (see figure 
1).  Higher funding costs on SIFIs could have implications on banks return on investment (ROI). Weaker banks might 
have difficulties raising sufficient fund for their normal operations, if mandatory bail-in clauses are attached to them. 
Such banks will be forced to raise short-term capital to fund their risky assets, which eventually may lead to a funding 
gap between the bank’s assets and liabilities. Funding gap problem increases a bank’s probability of default (PD) and 
expected loss (EL)9 
 
Figure 1: Bank Spreads on the Rise Since 2009 
Source: MarkIT, Bloomberg 
Impact on SIFIs Capital Structure 
Bail-in regime may also have a significant implication on SIFIs’ capital structure in terms of the composition of the 
bank liabilities.  Bank mangers might attempt to rearrange their funding structure in order to avoid bail-in measures, 
for example, going for short-term and secured borrowing. Short-term funding for SIFIS could be a recipe for another 
                                                             
9 Expected Loss (EL) = Probability of Default (PD) * Earning at Default (EAD) * Loss Given Default (LGD) 
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financial crisis, waiting to explode. Diamond. D, and Rajan. R (2001) explained that if banks financed illiquid 
investment from short-term borrowing, the increased illiquidity of the investment being financed could trigger a 
financial crisis. Funding structure also has an implication for financial stability; a report by the International Monetary 
Fund (2013) documented that overreliance by some banks on certain types of wholesale funding contributed to the 
global financial crisis. If the capital structure of SIFIs is altered in favour of short-term debt, it would make 
compliance with the Basel III’s net stable funding ratio (NSFR10) requirements nearly impossible to meet. Also there 
could be serious implications for the bank’s profitability, rating and ability to withstand shock.  
Potential Impacts of Asset Separation Tool 
Unlike bail-in, asset separation, also known as “Good Bank Bad Bank” is not a new bank resolution tool.  It is dated 
back to the great depression era, and since been used to resolve ailing financial institutions. Asset separation as a crisis 
resolution measure has been tested again and again, the list of systemic important financial institutions (SIFIs) that has 
been successfully restructured through this mechanism in the last few decades is not exhaustive (see table 7). It is 
obvious from table below that the recent financial crisis has made bad banks a financial crisis resolution tool of 
choice. 
Table 7: Bad Banks, Country of Origin and Year of Establishment 
 
SIFIs Country of Origin Year 
Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) United Kingdom 2009 
UBS AG Switzerland 2008 
Irish Nationwide Ireland 2009 
Bank of Ireland Ireland 2009 
AIB Ireland 2009 
Fortis Bank Netherlands 2008 
Societe Generale France 2008 
Commerze Bank Germany 2009 
Dresdner Bank Germany 2003 
Unicredit Italy 2008 
Landesbank Germany 2009 
Nordbanken Sweden 1992 
Nordbank Germany 2009 
Source: Central Bank Web sites, Government reports, press search 
Given the number of bad banks that have been used to resolve problems in the recent financial crisis, one would 
wonder why “Good bank Bad bank” is a resolution tool of choice for policy makers, and why the Commission 
included it as one of the tools for the banking resolution and recovery directive.  
 In a good bank-bad bank structure, the assets of a sick systemic important financial institution (SIFI) is separated into 
its profitable and non-profitable components, allowing the profitable entity (good bank) to continue its normal 
business operations while the non- profitable or distressed entity (bad bank) is structured with a view to liquidating 
bad assets or loan recovery. Schafer. D, and Zimmermann. K, (2009) documented that bad banks provides a 
transparent removal of toxic assets and gives banks a fresh start, keep the costs to taxpayers low and curtailed the risk 
of moral hazard. The impacts of this type of arrangement on SIFIs include: 
Impact on SIFIs Rating  
Removing distressed asset from the good bank balance sheet of and placing them in the bad bank should improve the 
debt rating of the good bank. Higher credit rating will boost the confidence of potential equity and debt investors and 
                                                             
10 The NSFR is an essential component of the Basel III reforms to promote a more resilient banking sector. It is designed to ensure 
that banks maintain a stable funding profile in relation to the characteristics of their on- and off-balance sheet activities. A robust 
funding structure reduces the likelihood that a bank's liquidity position deteriorates, due to disruptions to its regular sources of 
funding, in a way that would lead to increased risk of failure and, potentially, to broader systemic stress. In particular, the NSFR 
limits over-reliance on short-term wholesale funding, encourages better assessment of funding risk across all on- and off-balance 
sheet items, and promotes funding stability.(Basel III, 2014) 
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other clients to transact business with the bank. One of the main goals of taking banks through the path of “good 
bank-bad bank” structural solution is to maximise the value of the good bank. Investors, depositors and counterparties 
will put a much higher valuation on a financial institution with a healthy balance sheet with less risky assets. 
Confidence in a bank to meet its obligations is particularly vital at a time when credit risk in the financial system is on 
the high. 
Impact on  SIFIs Profitability 
Separating distressed assets will reduce the cost of funds of the good bank; reduce loss provision to the barest 
minimum. This will make more funds available to the good bank to engage in more profitable business activities. 
Impact of asset separation on profitability was evident in the restructuring of Mellon Bank Corporation in 1988, the 
earnings of the “good bank,” Mellon Bank NA, increased following the sale of the distressed asset to Great Street 
National Bank (GSNB). GNSB completed the liquidation of all loans within three years and wound down in 1995 
after meeting all its obligations. 
Impact on SIFIs “Going Concern” 
Asset separation tool provide an ailing systemic important financial institution a lifeline to survive. With minimal 
public intervention, separation of a highly leverage bank into “good bank- bad bank” provides the good bank with a 
new lease of life to continue business operations on a clean slate. Many of the Swedish banks11 affected by the house-
price bubble in the early 1990s were successfully restructured by creating “bad banks”, and are still in in operations. 
UBS AG and Citigroup also went through the “good bank-bad bank” structural solution in 2008 and 2009 
respectively.  
Impact on SIFIs business Model/Strategy 
A successful restructuring will equip the good bank’s management with the opportunity to refocus the bank on its core 
business. The ability to separate the viable assets from the non-performing asset gives banks management the 
advantage of de-leverage the good bank balance sheet. New business strategies/models to move the good bank 
forward will be better implemented on a clean slate without the distractions associated with non-performing assets. 
Potential Impact of Bridge Bank 
A bridge bank is a temporary arrangement designed to bridge the gap between a failed bank and the time such bank is 
acquired by a third party. Technically, a bridge bank is a nationalized bank, administered by government agency in 
many countries. For example bank of England in the UK or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in the 
U.S. In a bridge bank, the assets and liabilities of the failed bank are transferred to the administering government 
agency, which runs the day to day operations of the bank.  The impacts of bridge on SIFIs include: 
Impact on the Continuity  
Bridge bank arrangement maintains the “going concern” of the failed bank. It is a crisis resolution tool of choice for 
large and complex banks. When a systemic important financial institution administration is transferred to a bridge 
bank, it provides the administrator the power to take full control of the bank and   stabilise it and eventually sold to a 
third party. In addition, bridge bank also preserve the franchise value of the bank in question.  
Impact on Banking Operations 
The banking operations of the affected banks are allowed to continue as normal12 without the disruption of a closure 
which usually characterises failed bank.  
 
 
 
                                                             
11 During its early-1990s banking crisis, the Swedish authorities established two AMCs (Securum and Retrieva )to managed the  
bad debts of two of its largest banks, Nordbanken and Gota Bank, These AMCs successfully managed the bank’s bad assets.  
12 Some operations of the bridge bank  for example, lending may be scaled back 
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Conclusions 
It is difficult to provide a full analysis of the impact of the new banking directive before it is implemented; further 
work will be required to provide a detail empirical impact analysis on TBTF banks. Our objective in this paper 
however, has been to provide an ex ante assessment of the implementation impacts of the directive.  We have not 
considered all the possible implications of the directive on systemic financial institutions; the paper is narrowly 
focused on some of the key resolution tools proposed by the Commission. 
The failure of systemic important financial institutions in the last financial crisis has had a debilitating impact on both 
the real economy of the EU Member States and the financial system, and the handling of the crisis has exposed some 
fundamental flaws and weaknesses in the existing resolution regimes. Public funds were largely used to bail out the so 
called TBTF banks, and the concomitant moral hazard of the bailout regime among other factors, led the European 
Commission authorities to seek “optimal” strategy to meet the Key Resolution Attributes as specified by the Financial 
Standard Board (FSB). The new banking resolution framework will equip policymakers in Member States with 
common powers and tools to proactively resolve any failing/failed systemic financial institution in an orderly manner. 
The impact of the new directive on SIFIs could be significant. For instance, possible effects of the bail-in tool could 
result in an increase in funding costs and a change in the funding and capital structure of the affected SIFI. Other 
adverse effects may include credit rating downgrade and adverse implication for bank lending. Asset separation and 
Bridge bank resolution regimes could provide an ailing SIFI a new lease of life. While asset separation could 
significantly improve profitability and credit rating of affected banks, Bridge bank could ensure uninterrupted 
business operations and continuity of resolved banks. 
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